Multifactor Inequality: Substitution Effects for Income Sources in Mexico by Maria Elena Garcia Reyes
 









Multifactor Inequality: Substitution Effects for 
Income Sources in Mexico 
 































Maria Elena García Reyes
* 
University of York 
 
 






Income is a poor indicator of welfare and should be use only as a as component of 
welfare. Wealth provides another dimension of well-being. We use the Kullback-
Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC, hereafter) as a measure of the discrepancy 
between two attributes. This will allow economists and researchers to understand 
the kind of relationship that the attributes hold. The applications deals with an 
unusual analysis of income factors in which we treat them as different attributes. 
This allows us to estimate the substitution effects among income factors. 
 
Keywords: entropy, cross-entropy, KLIC, multi-attribute, multifactor,   welfare 
matrix, Theil index, Gini index 
JEL Classification: D33 
 
 
                                                 
* Contact details: Maria Elena Garcia Reyes; University of York; Department of Economics; Heslington, 
York YO105DD, U.K. megr100@york.ac.uk 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Welfare distribution has widely been discussed as the distribution of income.
This means that individuals are not distinguished by anything other than in-
come, because their other diﬀerences are either not known or are considered as
irrelevant, or a mixture of both.1 There are several reasons to believe that
income is a poor indicator of welfare and should be used only as a as component
of welfare. Wealth provides another dimension of well-being. Two people who
h a v et h es a m ei n c o m em a yn o tb ee q u a l l yw e l lo ﬀ if one person has more wealth.
If one person owns his home, for example, and the other person doesn’t, then
the former is better oﬀ. Many other attributes that compose an individuals
well-being such as consumption, education, health or other attributes, are rele-
vant to the individuals well being. In the literature there has been an increasing
interest in the ﬁeld of multidimensional inequality. First by Kolm [7] followed
1See Kolm [7].
1by Atkinson and Bourguinon [2] who explored the foundation of multidimen-
sional inequality. In the recent years there has been expanding literature on
the topic2.
We believe that the sources of income are dependent. Furthermore, we be-
lieve that the sources of income compensate each other as a response to inequal-
ity and/or polarisation. In other words, when one income source diminishes
another increases to compensate for either inequality or polarisation. There-
fore, it is important to measure the degree of mutual information between the
sources of income as an approximation of early stages of polarisation.
The Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC, hereafter) is a measure
of the discrepancy between two probability distributions. In our case between
two sources of income. The KLIC (KL(vj,v i)) is also referred to as the cross-




vj ln(vj/vi) for i6= j (1)
where:
vj,v i denote the ﬁnite or countable vectors of probability weights implied by
the discrete distributions.
i =( 1 ,2,...m)
j =( 1 ,2,...m)
m =6:sources of income
v1 :Probability of recieving earned income: y1
v2 :Probability of receiving self employed income: y2
v3 :Probability of receiving property income: y3
v4 :Probability of receiving income derived from cooperatives: y4
v5 :Probability of receiving employers contributions: y5
v6 :Probability of receiving other sources of income: y6
The distribution in the second position of the argument list in KL(vj,v i),
here vi, is called the reference distribution. We refer to the ﬁrst distribution in
the argument list, here vj as the subject distribution. In terms of our research
the KLIC KL(vj,v i) is the cross-entropy of income source j relative to income
source i. In other words, the KLIC between two distributions is the response
of income source j relative to the subject distribution of income source i.
Properties
• KL is not symmetric in vj and vi a n dt h u si ng e n e r a lKL(vj,v i) 6=
KL(vi,v j)
• KL(vj,v i) > 0 for every vj > 0 and
• KL(vj,v i)=0if vj = vi.
• T h eg r e a t e rt h ev a l u eo fKL(vj,v i), the greater the discrepancy between
the distributions vj and vj.
2See Maasoumi [9], Tsiu [17].
2From the fact that the KLIC is not symmetric, note that it is not a true
measure of the distance between vj and vi and it is referred to instead as a
pseudo-distance function. For our purposes it is very important to notice this
characteristic since one could easily misinterpret the results. Therefore, this
characteristic should be borne in mind and when reporting results, all pairs of
KLIC must be interpreted the resulting matrix will not be symmetric.
The KLIC will not only exhibit discrepancy between income factors but also
measure how income factors compensate each other.
In terms of our hypothesis, this means that if there is no increased inequality
or polarisation then the values for the KLIC will remain the same:
KLt(vj,v i)=KLt+1(vj,v i)
It is only in the presence of inequality or polarisation that the income factors
respond to these changes and the KLIC will diﬀer:
KLt(vj,v i) 6= KLt+1(vj,v i)
These attributes makes the KLIC a very interesting measure of polarisation.
The results are presented on the following matrix for each year that has been
analysed.
Table 1: Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion Matrix ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 KL(v2,v1) KL(v3,v1) KL(v4,v1) KL(v5,v1) KL(v6,v1)
KL(v1,v2)0KL(v3,v2) KL(v4,v2) KL(v5,v2) KL(v6,v2)
KL(v1,v3) KL(v2,v3)0KL(v4,v3) KL(v5,v3) KL(v6,v3)
KL(v1,v4) KL(v2,v4) KL(v3,v4)0KL(v5,v4) KL(v6,v4)
KL(v1,v5) KL(v2,v5) KL(v3,v5) KL(v4,v5)0KL(v6,v5)
KL(v1,v6) KL(v2,v6) KL(v3,v6) KL(v4,v6) KL(v5,v6)0
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
Note that the main diagonal is equal to zero, and that the upper and lower
diagonals are diﬀerent. Therefore the matrix is not symmetric. Thus the
Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC, hereafter) which is a measure of
divergence or distance between distributions. We aim to incorporate our appli-
cation and other properties of the KLIC to the literature of multidimensional
indices. The KLIC is a measure of the discrepancy between two probability
distributions, in our case the distributions of two attributes. This will allow
economists and researchers to understand the kind of relationship that the at-
tributes hold. By this we mean that attributes may be complement or substitute
goods between them.
In this paper we discuss the main deﬁnitions of multidimensional inequality,
and the way the KLIC ﬁts into the literature. Only two main applications
were derived, multifactor analysis for the Mexican case and multidimensional
inequality in Mexico. The ﬁrst application deals with an usual analysis of
income factors in which we treat them as diﬀerent attributes. This allows us to
estimate the substitution eﬀects among income factors. The second application
3deals with the estimation of multidimensional inequality in Mexico using two
attributes: monetary and non monetary income. Both applications seemed
to have very intuitive results. Unfortunately our data base does not cover
other variables apart from monetary and non monetary income and thus the
impossibility of estimating multiattribute inequality. And although we do not
have data for other attributes, diﬀerent from income, the procedure of estimation
would remain the same. It is kept for further research to obtain non income
data and estimate multiattribute inequality using this procedure.
2B a c k g r o u n d a n d D e ﬁnitions
Let us start by deﬁning the welfare matrix y as:
y =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
y11 y12 y13 ...y 1m
y21 . . ...y 2m
y31 . . ...y 3m
. . . ... .
yn1 yn2 . ...y nm
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(2)
where:
yij be the amount of attribute m received by individual or household i.
i =1 ,...,n : the number of individuals or households and,
j =1 ,...,m : the attributes.
Thus, the Welfare Matrix y (2) is a matrix of size n × m. The Welfare
Matrix is associated with the Probability Welfare Matrix v (3) in that it is a
matrix of size n × m a n de a c he l e m e n tvij is interpreted as the probability of
individual i of receiving j type of income3
v =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
v11 v12 v13 ...v 1m
v21 . . ...v 2m
v31 . . ...v 3m
. . . ... .
vn1 vn2 . ...v nm
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(3)
The two Theil indices which belong to the Generalized Entropy Family (GE



















4pi =1 /n is the units population share.
The GE are homogenous (in a single attribute), symmetric, and consistent
with the Lorenz criterion with respect to S. Useful decomposability properties
of I(·).

























































Both (6) and (7) are weighted averages of the KLIC. It follows that multidi-
mensional inequality is no more than the weighted average of attribute inequal-
ities and that this reﬂects the substitution eﬀects between sources of income.
Theil’s second measure (7) satisﬁes “general homogeneity” property and Sym-
metry.
Two main applications stand out. The ﬁrst is linked with our last chapter
and some of the discussion of income sources. We can now estimate the sub-
stitution eﬀects between income sources. The second application is regarding
the multi-attribute case. Estimating multidimensional inequality incorporating
other attributes such as monetary and non monetary income for the Mexican
Case.
In both cases the application will use Multidimensional two Theil Index
(7) because it satisﬁes the properties of “general homogeneity” property and
symmetry.
3 Multifactor Inequality in Mexico and Income
Sources Substitution Eﬀects
The Probability Welfare Matrix v ( 3 )t h a ti sam a t r i xo fs i z en × m and each




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
v11 v12 v13 ...v 1m
v21 . . ...v 2m
v31 . . ...v 3m
. . . ... .
vn1 vn2 . ...v nm
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(8)
where:
i =( 1 ,2,...n)
f =( 1 ,2,...m)
n : The number of households.
m =6:Sources of income
yi,1 :Earned income,
yi,2 :Self employed income,
yi,3 :Property income,
yi,4 :Income derived from cooperatives,
yi,5 :Employers contributions and,



























The results obtained were:















1984 1989 1992 1994
Do
The values of the Gini Index of Relative Inequality using the covariance
approach (??) are shown in the following table:
Table 3: Gini Index





Notice that the results are consistent in trend with those in Table 3) but
they diﬀer in magnitude. Let’s recall Maasoumi’s (1986) [9] interpretation of
multidimensional inequality.“Multidimensional inequality is no more than the
weighted average of attribute inequalities. This reﬂects the substitution eﬀects5
o ft h ei n c o m ef a c t o r ss h o w no nTable (7).
The above table not only makes sense but is also consistent with the esti-
mations on Chapter 3 (See Table (3.1). This approach has allowed us to put
together most of the results related to income factor analysis and to obtain a
value of the substitution eﬀects between factors. The substitution eﬀects are,
in our opinion, very valuable estimates because they express how much one
source compensates for existing inequality and it also reﬂects early stages of
polarisation.
The next graph shows the substitution eﬀects of the income factors using a
multifactor analysis.
5Substitution Eﬀect: when the price of a good increases it does so relative to all other
goods. Although each good is unique it has substitutes - other goods that will serve almost
as well. As the opportunity cost of a good rises, people will tend to buy less of it and more of
its substitutes.
7Table 4: Substitution Eﬀects between Income Factors
1984 1989 1992 1994
y1 0.384594786 0.280250495 0.448665933 0.390663415
y2 0.087517449 0.060059978 0.119302945 0.065346989
y3 0.0106158 0.004008086 0.012182658 0.006274994
y4 0.00103653 0.008084923 0.002560909 0.009824298
y5 0.038089643 0.016918159 0.072060755 0.049327871
y6 0.097092461 0.001835677 0.203849055 0.081821585












1984 1989 1992 1994
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6
We can see that Earned income (yi,2) and, Self employed income (yi,2)a r e
good substitutes and this is quite reasonable, since most of your income is
derived from labour in one way or another. Another income factor with high
substitution eﬀect is (yi,6) Other sources of income. This factor contains income
from the sale of second-hand items, such as selling cars, heritage, lottery, loans,
etc. The other values are smaller which means that the other income sources
act as complementary goods rather than substitute goods. In the presence
of income inequality and/or polarisation, agents will ﬁrst compensate for it by
increasing those income factors with higher substitution eﬀect, rather than the
ones that are complements.
3.1 Standard Theory: Decomposition of Inequality by In-
come Factors
Most index numbers in common usage exhibit some kind of decomposition prop-
erty that enables the overall index value to be computed from sub-aggregates
These sub-aggregates are typically based on grouping together observations
which share common characteristics.
8The problem can be formally stated if we denote the income of an individual
i from source j by yij (j =1 ,2,...m) for m types of income. The distribution
of factor j is represented by (y1j,...ynj)=yj. Assuming that the factor in-
come categories are mutually exclusive, and that the total income is the sum of





Thus, the assessment of inequality contribution of factor j becomes the problem
of determining the impact of yj on yi. If for any inequality index I(yi) we have
some way of writing I(yi)=
n P
j=1
βj,w h e r eβj depends on income from source j,
then βj might be regarded as the contribution of factor j to aggregate inequality.
Equivalently, the fractions bj =
βj
I(yi) can be interpreted as proportional factor
contributions.
We say that a function is a decomposition rule if it produces suitable values



























The following results were obtained:
Table 5: Factor Contributions to Inequality
1984 1989 1992 1994
βEARNED 0.2365332 0.2291129571 0.22402225523 0.26451417461
βSELF_EMPLOYED 0.1339064 0.14888827467 0.1718982203 0.11521696311
βPROPERTY 0.025268 0.02109505329 0.01228256321 0.00935108237
βCOOPERATIV ES 0.0011633 0.04162961 0.00351754158 0.01366323953
βTRANSFERS 0.0523992 0.04957847066 0.05708796984 0.03493331808
βOTHERS 0.0629652 0.01926070083 0.10431529034 0.04278241313 P
βi = Gini 0.5122354 0.50956506654 0.5731238405 0.48046119084
9Table 6: Proportional Factor Contributions to Inequality
1984 1989 1992 1994
bEARNED 0.4736 0.4677 0.4752 0.5253
bSELF_EMPLOY ED 0.2613 0.2922 0.2981 0.2378
bPROPERTY 0.0493 0.0414 0.0213 0.0190
bCOOPERATIVES 0.0023 0.0817 0.0061 0.0282
bTRANSFERS 0.1023 0.0973 0.0990 0.0721
bOTHERS 0.1229 0.0378 0.1809 0.0883 P
bi 1111
It is not surprising that the highest factor of contribution is due to what can
be described as payment for any kind of labour, including earned income and
self-employed income, but there is one result that is worthy of more attention.
This is the fact that the rest of the factor contributions reversed their positions
in 1992.




















4 Multidimensional Inequality in Mexico
For this application we will deﬁne welfare the matrix as W:
10W =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨









⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(11)
where:
i =( 1 ,2,...n)
f =( 1 ,2)
n : The number of households.



























The results obtained were:






These results are consistent with the Gini Coeﬃcient (See Table ??) and
with the previous results they diﬀer in magnitude but they follow the same
trend. The diﬀerence in magnitude should be a topic of further research.
The substitution eﬀects are shown on the following table:
Table 8: Substitution Eﬀects between Monetary and Non-Monetary Income
1984 1989 1992 1994
Monetary 0.451266179 0.430240301 0.497773814 0.372933906
Non-Monetary Income 0.175186945 0.173484326 0.140859439 0.217302643
The substitution eﬀects between monetary and non-monetary income are
consitent with intuition. Monetary income has a higher substitution eﬀect.
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MULTIDIMENSIONAL INEQUALITY
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Two main applications of multidimensional inequality were drawn in this chap-
ter. The ﬁrst is regarding multifactor income inequality, maybe the most in-
teresting application for the purposes of the research. This concluding chapter
manages to put together consistently the diﬀerent estimations for income fac-
tor contribution to overall inequality into one single index with the most useful
interpretation of the substitution eﬀects among factors.
There are several ways to express the degree of income inequality in a soci-
ety, we have chosen to decompose income and the participation of each income
factor into overall income inequality. This technique is relatively simple and
revealing; it has allowed us to understand not only the impact of each income
source to overall inequality but also it reveals the relationship between those
income factors. When we ﬁrst decompose inequality into income factors we
did it believing there was a relationship between income factors and that those
were not independent. (See Table ??) We used standard theory to describe
the participation of each income source into overall inequality. Those estima-
tions made us suspect about the relationship among income factors and the ﬁnal
results presented in this chapter showed that the relationship between income
factors may be expressed in terms of their substitution eﬀects. In practical
terms it means that policy makers not only have, more information but a more
powerful one. Policies designed to decrease income inequality may do so, by in-
creasing by any means income derived from sources that act as complementary
“goods”. Those income sources that reﬂect payment to labour have higher sub-
12stitution eﬀects the other sources of income may be regarded as complementary
“goods”. The other application deals with multi-attribute inequality, applied
to monetary and non monetary income. Monetary income is able to substitute
non monetary income in a higher proportion than non monetary income. The
applications of multi-attribute inequality have a wide range. Attributes such
as education, health and any other attribute that contributes to the individual
well being.
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